Trump's new approach to national security is to break agreements, attack Europe, and steer clear of autocrats.
The approach validates the volatility and unpredictability of the US: hedging is still the most effective way for other nations to react.
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The national security plan of President Donald Trump was met with applause in Beijing and Moscow as well as a thud throughout Europe. The 33-page grand strategy promotes commercial connections, strategic stability with Russia, and a strong US hand in Latin America, with the sharpest criticisms reserved for Europe's present course.
The president's 2017 plan, which referred to both China and Russia as "revisionist powers" attempting to "weaken US influence," is abandoned by the document's scant mentions of China, and only as an economic rival. For those who have placed the US-European alliance and dedication to democratic ideals at the center of collective security agreements, the new policy is a sobering read.
The president's 2017 plan, which referred to both China and Russia as "revisionist powers" attempting to "weaken US influence," is abandoned by the document's scant mentions of China, and only as an economic rival. For those who have placed the US-European alliance and dedication to democratic ideals at the center of collective security agreements, the new policy is a sobering read.
A security strategy is fundamentally a compilation of bureaucratic directives and a public message document. It is bound by the president's decision-making, not the other way around. As a result, few administrations have adhered strictly to the text's wording. Additionally, all of these tactics are susceptible to being swiftly surpassed by events.
Compared to his initial strategy, the 2025 plan is more in line with Trump's philosophy. However, its efficacy will be constrained by its paradoxes.
Compared to his initial strategy, the 2025 plan is more in line with Trump's philosophy. However, its efficacy will be constrained by its paradoxes.
A more compliant system that produces a more faithful text
It is understandable that Trump's plans for 2017 and 2025 read like two rather distinct governments.
Based on "principled realism," which aimed to advance US principles and take into account global power dynamics, the 2017 statement recognized great power competition with China and Russia as the key US foreign policy challenge. It was a compromise document between the facilitators (such Stephen Miller and William Barr) and the cabinet moderators of Trump's impulses (like Jim Mattis, HR McMaster, and Rex Tillerson). There was internal discussion, some of it rather contentious. Additionally, the author was a career State Department civil servant, thus the bureaucracy was ostensibly involved in creating the language.
Based on "principled realism," which aimed to advance US principles and take into account global power dynamics, the 2017 statement recognized great power competition with China and Russia as the key US foreign policy challenge. It was a compromise document between the facilitators (such Stephen Miller and William Barr) and the cabinet moderators of Trump's impulses (like Jim Mattis, HR McMaster, and Rex Tillerson). There was internal discussion, some of it rather contentious. Additionally, the author was a career State Department civil servant, thus the bureaucracy was ostensibly involved in creating the language.
Eight years later, business agreements and authoritarian accommodations are the driving forces behind the new approach. With few checks, Trump's vision has been furthered by a cabinet made up entirely of supporters. There won't be any resistance to its implementation if the bureaucracy is intimidated by DOGE and mass terminations.
Close Strong transatlantic ties are no longer seen as essential to US national security, and Trump's allies have imbued the language with contempt for Europe. Commercial agreements may take precedence over values in this approach. By not interfering in each other's territory, great powers may coexist. Strength is also important.
Despite the fact that the document represents a government that aims to empower the president, it is riddled with inconsistencies and gaps.
Close Strong transatlantic ties are no longer seen as essential to US national security, and Trump's allies have imbued the language with contempt for Europe. Commercial agreements may take precedence over values in this approach. By not interfering in each other's territory, great powers may coexist. Strength is also important.
Despite the fact that the document represents a government that aims to empower the president, it is riddled with inconsistencies and gaps.
The exception of the autocrat
According to the plan, the US will no longer "hector" Middle Eastern regimes in their internal affairs. When questioned about Jamal Khashoggi's death during a meeting with the Saudi Crown Prince in the Oval Office, Trump recently responded, "Things happen."
The plan argues that Washington should not "impose on them democratic or other social change that differs widely from their traditions and histories," therefore the approach is neither "inconsistent nor hypocritical."
However, in order to prevent Europe's "civilizational erasure," the approach makes a forceful family intervention. It claims that unrestricted immigration, falling birthrates, and "censorship of free speech and suppression of political opposition" pose a threat to Europe's European identity.
The strategy's "great optimism" for the emergence of "patriotic European parties" expands upon the ideas of Vice President JD Vance's February speech at the Munich Security Conference, stating the hitherto silent section aloud:
Transatlantic ethno-nationalist groups will be fostered by the US. However, it won't interfere in other areas. It defies decades of US declared policy and is the strategy's most striking and illuminating contradiction.
The strategy's "great optimism" for the emergence of "patriotic European parties" expands upon the ideas of Vice President JD Vance's February speech at the Munich Security Conference, stating the hitherto silent section aloud:
Transatlantic ethno-nationalist groups will be fostered by the US. However, it won't interfere in other areas. It defies decades of US declared policy and is the strategy's most striking and illuminating contradiction.
In the West, there is a sheriff, but not elsewhere.
Latin American S management is now a defined policy. The "Trump Corollary" to the Monroe Doctrine, which repurposes a 19th-century arrangement, enlists and strengthens US connections with regional countries to manage migration, combat drug trafficking, and safeguard vital supply chains.
They are informed that these nations must choose between "a parallel one which they are influenced by countries on the other side of the world" and "an American-led world of sovereign countries and free economies." It's a bold power move. If the plan is funded, which is a major if, US troops will flood the area, obedient governments will receive financial support, and these leaders will be under much more pressure from the US.
They are informed that these nations must choose between "a parallel one which they are influenced by countries on the other side of the world" and "an American-led world of sovereign countries and free economies." It's a bold power move. If the plan is funded, which is a major if, US troops will flood the area, obedient governments will receive financial support, and these leaders will be under much more pressure from the US.
The US will ruthlessly prioritize rather than act as Atlas, supporting the entire planet. However, it will also look for peace agreements everywhere.
However, the policy warns other nations not to attempt this at home. The United States will stop "domination by any single competitor nation" globally. Given the South China Sea's significance for international commerce, the strategy in Asia rejects the "potential for any competitor to control the South China Sea." To "prevent any adversarial power from dominating" Europe, the US may and must cooperate with partners and friends.
However, the policy warns other nations not to attempt this at home. The United States will stop "domination by any single competitor nation" globally. Given the South China Sea's significance for international commerce, the strategy in Asia rejects the "potential for any competitor to control the South China Sea." To "prevent any adversarial power from dominating" Europe, the US may and must cooperate with partners and friends.
Peripheral global peacemaker
According to the plan, the US will brutally prioritize rather than act as Atlas, supporting the entire planet.
However, it will also look for peace agreements everywhere. The document defends Trump's attempts to resolve disputes in "peripheral" areas because agreements can boost stability, bolster power, and open up new markets even in nations outside of the US's "core interests."
That would seem to go against any attempt to prioritize policies if it were adopted widely. The main focus here is President Trump's Nobel Peace Prize campaign.
However, it will also look for peace agreements everywhere. The document defends Trump's attempts to resolve disputes in "peripheral" areas because agreements can boost stability, bolster power, and open up new markets even in nations outside of the US's "core interests."
That would seem to go against any attempt to prioritize policies if it were adopted widely. The main focus here is President Trump's Nobel Peace Prize campaign.
China as a trading partner and issue
The new approach views China less as a military adversary and more as a strong economic force. However, is the US seeking "a genuinely mutually advantageous economic relationship" or economic detachment from China?
The plan denounces threats against US supply chains, unfair trade practices, intellectual property theft, industrial espionage, predatory state-directed subsidies, and exports of precursors to fentanyl.
The plan denounces threats against US supply chains, unfair trade practices, intellectual property theft, industrial espionage, predatory state-directed subsidies, and exports of precursors to fentanyl.
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